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The author argues that Stephen Hawking makes implicit reference to and attempts to
undermine two classical argumentsfor the existence ofGod: the teleological and the cosmo-
logicat arguments. Further, the author shows that, in fact. Hawking's "No Boundary Pro-
posal"—even if it were to be empirically verified—would not entirely discredit these two ar-
guments, but would, instead, transform them into epistemic icons that reveal the immanent
presence of God in the cosmos.
Stephen Hawking's A Brief History of
Time is "a book about God—or perhaps about
the absence of God." So says the late Carl
Sagan in his introduction to the book. Ac-
cording to Sagan, Hawking presents to his
readers ''a universe with no edge in space, no
beginning or end in time, and nothing for a
Creator to do." ' Given the fact that Hawking
repeatedly intimates that cosmology leaves
scientists with serious doubts about the exist-
ence of God, Sagan's reading of the book
seems to be a fair one.
A BriefHistory ofTime can be taken as an
extended argument for Hawking's famous "no
boundary proposal" (NBP). Common sense
dictates that the universe is either infinite in
age and without boundary, or else finite in age
with a boundary at a singularity.' In flagrant
violation of common sense, Hawking's pro-
posal states that the universe is both finite and
edgeless (without a singularity). The first
seven chapters of Hawking's book lay out the
essential evidence for the NBP. Hawking de-
scribes advances in physics during this cen-
tury, making special note of confirmations of
quantum mechanics and the general theory of
relativity. These are the two theories upon
which the NBP rests. It is in fusing these two
theories^ that Hawking hopes to make a case
for the NBP
But how does the NBP relate to Hawking's
insinuation of God's absence? The follow-
ing paper is an attempt to answer this ques-
tion. According to Hawking, "if the universe
is completely self-contained, with no
singularities or boundaries, and completely
described by a unified theory, that fact has
profound implications for the role of God the
creator." ^ The reader is to assume, I think,
that these implications are almost entirely
negative for God. Joseph Zycinski puts it this
way, "cosmological edgelessness implies
metaphysical denial of the existence of God."
^ Hawking takes the NBP to be pointing to
(hinting at) the absence of God in the universe.
As Darwin seemingly forced the hand of God
out of human creation, a century later Hawk-
ing seems to be forcing the hand of God out
of universal creation.
I have serious doubts about the NBP's
negative implications for God. I will argue
here that, even if the reality of the NBP be
admitted, that is a long way from removing
God from the cosmos. But, before I argue
that point I want to closely examine the con-
text in which the NBP arises in A Brief His-
The Boston Theological Institute 191
tory ofTime. I am interested in the metaphysi-
cal mileage that Hawking gets out of the NBP.
What I hope to show is that Hawking uses the
NBP to fend off both the teleological and cos-
mological arguments for God's existence
—
arguments that immediately come to mind in
light of the kind of physical evidence pre-
sented by Hawking in A BriefHistory ofTime.
It would be too much to say that Hawking,
foreseeing the theistically tinged implications
of the physical evidence, dredges up the NBP
deliberately to undercut the teleological and
cosmological arguments. However, I think it
As Hawkingjettisons the point of singu-
larity—the very theory that he was respon-
sible for legitimating—he not only ex-
plains the existence of cosmic order with-
out recourse to theism^ but also diminishes
the plausibility ofa divine creation event.
is clear that Hawking, although he doesn't ex-
plicitly mention them, is conscious of these
arguments throughout his discussion of the
NBP. One could even read his discussion of
the NBP as revolving around the teleological
and cosmological arguments for God's exist-
ence.
In brief, it is my objective in this paper to
argue the following points. Firstly, I hope to
demonstrate that the NBP arises out of an at-
tempt to circumvent the teleological and cos-
mological arguments. Secondly, I puipose to
demonstrate that Haw king's arguments for the
NBP are based on a misguided notion of the
laws of nature. I will argue that he under-
stands the laws of nature to have an
unwarrantedly high ontological status and
comprehensibility. Thirdly, I contend that
even if Hawking is granted the reality of the
NBP, the presence of God is still not excluded
from the cosmos. Finally, I will recast the
teleological and cosmological arguments for
God's existence in light of the previous dis-
cussion. Rather than proving a wholly tran-
scendent Creator God, I propose that these ar-
guments are signals of God's immanence in
the order of the universe.
In the eighth chapter of A Brief History
of Time, Hawking introduces the NBP and
uses it to explain, without recourse to theism,
two perplexing physical phenomena: the ex-
istence of cosmic order'' and the existence of
a singularity. These two phenomena give rise
to two traditional arguments for God's exist-
ence. Cosmic order gives rise to the teleo-
logical argument and a singularity gives rise
to the cosmological argument. As I shall point
out. Hawking 's attempt to explain away the
^^, former (order) will even-
tually lead him to do
away with the latter (sin-
gularity).
Hawking begins the
eighth chapter by de-
scribing cosmic order.
The initial high tempera-
ture of the universe, the
critical rate of expansion
of the universe, the near
unifomiity of the early universe, and the lo-
cal irregularities in the early universe (which
allow for the formation of stars and galaxies)
are examples of cosmic order.'' Hawking ad-
mits that cosmic order is colored with theistic
possibility when he says, "one possible an-
swer is to say that God chose the initial con-
figuration of the universe."**
Hawking is certainly dealing with the te-
leological argument for God's existence. He
never explicitly mentions the argument by
name, but he gives wonderful expression to it
at one point in the text:
[I]t seems clear that there are relatively
few ranges of values for the numbers
thai would allow for the development of
any fomi of intelligent life. Most sets of
values would give rise lo universes that,
although they may be beautiful, would
contain no one able to wonder at that
beauty. One can take this either as
evidence of a divine purpose in Creation
and the choice of the laws of science or
as support for the strong anthropic
principle.''
Although he is aware of the theistic im-
plications of cosmic order. Hawking suggests
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that the strong anthropic principle (SAP)'"
might be adequate to exphiin the cosmic or-
der." However, Hawking rejects the SAP.'-
But having rejected it, Hawking does not stay
true to his earher either/or proposal. Instead,
he attempts to circumvent theistic fine-tun-
ing in another way. In order to minimize the
improbability of the cosmic order. Hawking
turns to the inflationary model'^ of the uni-
verse. The crucial characteristic of this model
for this discussion is that it does not require
fine-tuned initial conditions of the universe.
Quite a number of dirfcrenl initial
configurations for the universe would
have evolved to produce a universe like
the one we observe. If this is the case, a
universe thai developed from some sort
of random initial conditions should
contain a number of regions thai are
smooth and uniform and suitable for the
evolution of intelligent life.'^
This model undemiines the ideological
argument by positing an initial configuration
in just the sort of chaotic state that would be
expected from purely naturalistic assump-
tions. "This is important, because it shows
that the initial state of the part of the universe
that we inhabit did not have to be chosen with
great care." '"^
After a thorough discussion of various
inflationary models. Hawking concedes that
none of them can completely explain the pres-
ence of cosmic order in our universe.
[I|l cannot be the case thai every initial
configuration would have led to a
universe like the one we observe. [...]
There must have been initial configura-
tions that would not have given rise to a
universe like the one we see today. So
even the inllationary model does not tell
us why the initial configuration was not
such as to produce something very
different from what we now observe."'
So, the thorn in Hawking 's flesh, the pug-
nacious fact of cosmic order, remains.
Hawking's discussion of cosmic order
now becomes enmeshed in his singularity
theorem. Cosmic order is linked to the sin-
gularity theorem in the following way. The
absence of a singularity (the NBP) can account
for the resiliently inexplicable cosmic order.
How does the NBP explain the cosmic order?
First of all, the laws of nature break down at a
singularity, leaving us completely in the dark
as to the initial conditions of the universe. But
the NBP avoids this breakdown by removing
the infinite conditions found at the point of sin-
gularity. So, given the NBP. the laws of nature
apply across the whole universe. Secondly, if
a theory of quantum gravity is the ultimate
physical theory, and if it can span the whole
universe, then it might be able to explain why
we live in a universe that happens to have cos-
mic order. After all, the quantum theory of
gravity predicts which history of the universe,
among the many, is the most probable.
Under the no boundary proposal one
learns that the chance of the universe
being found to be following most of the
possible histories is negligible, but there
is a particular family of histories that are
much more probable than the others. '^
Thus, the quantum theory of gravity (read
in the context of the NBP) might show that a
universe with cosmic order is by far the most
probable universe.
The NBP, then, is a bold theoretical move.
As Hawking jettisons the point of singular-
ity—the very theory that he was responsible
for legitimating"*—he not only explains the
existence of cosmic order without recourse
to theism, but also diminishes the plausibility
of a divine creation event.
So long as the universe had a beginning,
one could suppose it had a creator. But
if the universe is completely self-
contained, having no boundary or edge,
it would have neither beginning nor end:
it would simply be. "What place then
for a creator?" '*
Notice that the NPB kills two birds with
one stone. Not only does it explain the cos-
mic order, but it also rids the universe of a
theistically-pregnant singularity. Hawking is
aware of these theistic implications within the
singularity when he writes, "many people do
not like the idea that time has a beginning,
probably because it smacks of divine inter-
vention."-" With the NBP, Hawking removes
these smatterings of divine intervention. He
also accounts for the presence of cosmic or-
der in a random universe.
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As much as Hawking's NBP arises within
the context of his rejection of the teleological
and cosmoiogical arguments for God's exist-
ence, I do not suggest that Hawking is moti-
vated by these arguments to construct his NBP.
Such a statement would require analysis of
his inner thoughts. Nevertheless, a comment
from Jane Hawking, Hawking's fomier wife,
reveals something of his repugnance to the-
ism:
There doesn't seem to be room in the
minds of people who ai'e working out
these things for other sources of
inspiration. You can't actually get an
answer out of Stephen regarding
philosophy beyond the realms of
science.-'
If one really cannot get an answer out of
Hawking beyond the realm of science, then
the NBP is an ideal preservative for him. The
NBP excises all extra-scientific elements from
the discussion of the cosmos. Debate over
the order and origin of the universe is her-
metically sealed from meddling theologians.
As has already been shown, the NBP also pro-
tects the laws of nature from breakdown at
the singularity. So, protection from potential
breakdown and preservation from unintelli-
gible outside influences are significant philo-
sophical aspects of the NBP. Both functions
ensure the final intelligibility of the laws of
nature. To see how determinative this main-
tenance of intelligibility is for Hawking's NBP
requires a few quotations from his book.
• Hawking assumes that positing God is
inextricably bound to positing an "initial con-
figuration of the universe—that we cannot
hope to understand." --
• Hawking complains that "if [God] had
started it off in such an incomprehensible way,
why did he choose to let it evolve according
to laws that we could understand?" -'
• Hawking reasons that "it would be only
natural to suppose that—order should apply
not only to the laws [of nature], but also to the
conditions at the boundary of space-time that
specify the initial state of the universe."-"'
• Hawking writes, "in order to predict how
the universe should have started off, one needs
laws that hold at the beginning of time."-"*
• Hawking constantly avoids what he calls
"a counsel of despair, a negation of all our
hopes of understanding the underlying order
of the universe."'*'
• In Hawking's analogy of the universe to
the globe, he hopes that "the laws of science
will hold at the [beginning and end of the uni-
verse], just as they do at the North and South
Poles on the earth.""
• Hawking's great hope is that "if we find
an answer to [the final laws of nature], it
would be the ultimate triumph of human rea-
son—for then we would know the mind of
God."2«
• Hawking makes the following argument
for the complete comprehensibility of the laws
of nature: "God could have started the uni-
verse off any way he wanted. But in that case
he also could have made it develop in a com-
pletely arbitrary way. Yet it appears that he
chose to make it evolve according to certain
laws. It therefore seems equally reasonable
to suppose that there are also laws governing
the initial state." -'^
• Hawking hopes that "the eventual goal
of science is to provide a single theory that
describes the whole universe." ""*
• Hawking bemoans the fact that "at the
singularity, general relativity and all other
physical laws would break down: one
couldn't predict what will come out of the sin-
gularity.""
It is clear from these quotations that
Hawking is dedicated to laws of nature that
are intelligible and unbreakable. But why is
he so loathe to entertain the possibility that
the laws of nature, fallible human construc-
tions of reality, might be interfered with or
broken? The answer is that Hawking does
nt)t think that the laws of nature are fallible
human constructions of reality. More often
than not, in his discussions of the laws of na-
ture, Hawking's view is neo-Platonic.
Zycinski labels this belief necessitarian, in that
it holds that the essence of the laws of nature
cannot be reduced to mere human observa-
tions of regularity. The necessitarian tradi-
tion "presupposes the existence of hidden
necessary links that constitute the order of
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nature."" So, instead of human best guesses,
approximate descriptions of the regularity ob-
served in nature. Hawking believes that the
laws of nature are fixed, real, independently-
existing entities that prescribe what events
must occur. From the above quotations, it ob-
vious that this neo-Plationic view is
Hawking's predominant reading of the laws
of nature. Given this understanding, it is clear
The final test of the ^^no boundary pro-
posal/' as Hawking admits, will be scien
tific—whether it can explain existing
phenomena or accurately predict new
phenomena; it will not be philosophical.
why Hawking would not want the laws to be
broken.
Hawking's determination to preserve and
protect the laws of nature is problematic for
two reasons. First, Hawking is not consistent
within his own treatment of the laws of nature.
Secondly, he naively assumes an unwarrantedly
high view of the laws of nature.
To begin. Hawking generally believes that
the laws of nature are far more than concepts
in the human mind. And yet, at the beginning
e)f A Brief History of Time, he writes the fol-
lowing:
[A] theory is just a model of the
universe, or a restricted part of it, and a
set of rules that relate quantities in the
model to observations that we make. It
exists only in our minds and docs not
have any other reality (whatever that
might mean).""^
Also, when Hawking needs to show that
imaginary time might be just as real as so-
called real time, he conveniently relativizes
the laws of nature.
So, maybe what we call imaginary time
is really more basic, and what we call
real is just an idea that we invent to help
us describe what we think that universe
is like. But according to the approach I
described in Chapter 1, a scientific
theory is just a mathematical model we
make to describe our observations: it
exists only in our minds."
Hawking seems to be playing metaphysi-
cal ping-pong with the laws of nature. Do
they exist only in our minds or are they invio-
lable, the very warp and woof of creation? If
they are only mathematical models, then are
they really worth preserving and protecting
by constructing the NBP?
Even if allowances are made for the in-
consistencies in Hawking's treatment of the
j.^, laws of nature, it is hard to
if ^
excuse his naive statements
about their high ontological
status. If Hawking is going
to treat the laws of nature as
binding realities that can
never be broken, then he
needs to make an argument
for it. This contention is es-
pecially true in light of the
multiple critiques of a neo-Platonic view of
the laws of nature in the last forty years. One
such critique comes from William Stoeger. In
a paper entitled "Quantum Cosmology and the
Laws of Nature." Stoeger lists at least five
reasons to doubt a neo-Platonic reading of the
laws of nature.'''' I simply list them here, with-
out explication:
1
.
We observe the laws of nature with lim-
ited/indirect instruments.
2. The laws of nature are always ideal-
ized from experimental data. The data never
quite fit the theory.
3. The laws of nature are always under-
determined by the data that they explain. Sev-
eral contradictory theories could often account
for the same data.
4. The history of science shows that cul-
tural presuppositions, human creativity, and
reigning paradigms play a crucial role in the
creation of theories.
5. The history of science shows that long-
established laws of nature are constantly be-
ing subsumed or replaced by new laws.
Although I will not draw out here a bal-
anced theory of the laws of nature based on
these five arguments, I think that they are suf-
ficient to undercut Hawking's assumptions.
To summarize, a critical role of Hawking's
NBP is to circumvent teleological and onto-
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logical reasoning for the existence of God; the
NBP is deeply motivated by Hawking's de-
sire to preserve and protect his high view of
the laws of nature; and finally, Hawking's high
view of the laws of nature is deeply problem-
atic. To return to my basic concern in this
The cosmological argument^ instead of
being a prooffor a cosmicjump-starter,
becomes an icon pointing the way to the
presence of the immanent God, who
constantly upholds, sustains, and makes
real a creation that would have no real-
ity apartfrom God.
essay, one way of relating the NBP to the ques-
tion of God's existence is to reject the NBP
on grounds of faulty reasoning. What I have
just summarized seems to legitimate that
claim. Argumentative theists could take what
I have just said and use it as a polemic against
the NBP
In spite of what I have just said, the final
test of the NBP, as Hawking admits, will be
scientific—whether it can explain existing
phenomena or accurately predict new phe-
nomena; it will not be philosophical. Thus,
before I conclude with a re-examination of
the teleological and cosmological arguments,
I want to assume that the NBP is true, and to
see how it relates to the question of God's ex-
istence. Unlike Hawking and Sagan, I think
that one can take the view that the NBP and
God's existence are cooperative "doctrines,"
rather than competitive ones.
One is forced to pit God and the NBP
against one another, I think, only if one as-
sumes what Zycinski calls a "Clarkean
physico-theology in which the God of scien-
tific gaps invented by Samuel Clarke is re-
placed by the God of cosmological edges." ^^
Hawking's dictum "if there is no edge,
there is no God, the Creator" expresses
the essence of the same philosophy
which we find in Clarke's gaps.^^
The essence of both philosophies is that
God operates only in realms unexplored by
science. So, the more that science explains
(say, at the edge of the cosmos), the farther
God's activity recedes (beyond the boundary
of the cosmos). If God really is only a magi-
cal explanation for all
that is mysterious, then
Hawking is right to say
that the NBP deals a
fatal blow to God as
Creator, because one of
the greatest mysteries
of all—the existence of
Creation, the cosmos
—
would be solved.
Thankfully, this
Clarkean physico-the-
ology need not be ac-
cepted. It would be more theologically ad-
equate to agree with Arthur Peacocke:
God is semper CxtMox—God is creating
now and continuously in and through the
inherent, inbuilt creativity of the natural
order, both physical and biological
—
creativity that is itself God in the
process of creating. ^'^
Paul Davies expresses the same idea whh
greater flourish.
The idea of God who is just another
force or agency at work in nature,
moving atoms here and there in
competition with physical forces is
profoundly uninspiring. To me, the true
miracles of nature are to be found in the
ingenious and unswerving lawfulness of
the cosmos, a lawfulness that permits
complex order to emerge from chaos,
life to emerge from inanimate matter,
and consciousness to emerge from life,
without the need for the occasional
supernatural prod; a lawfulness that
produces beings who not only ask great
questions of existence, but who, through
science and other metiiods of inquiry,
are even beginning to find answers.^"
So, the laws of nature, even if they turn
out to be neo-Platonic, do not have to be in
competition with God. Hawking said as much
several years after he wrote A Brief History
of Time. ""
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In Hawking 's new reading, the laws of
nature can be expressions of God's continu-
ing sustenance of creation. He might even
say that in the lawfulness of the cosmos God
is present in creation. This doctrine of divine
immanence is heuristically useful, I think,
towards integration of the NBP and the pres-
ence of God in the cosmos.
Divine immanence can also be a guiding
hermeneutic in attempts to make sense of the
teleological and cosmological arguments for
God's existence. Joseph Zycinski rightly
points out the following:
[Ojne should not expect that Hawking's
cosmology would provide a new
argument for the existence of God the
Creator and sUcngthen the standpoint of
Christian theism.^-'
And yet, Hawking's cosmology does have
interesting metaphysical implications which,
I think, are helpful in reworking the teleologi-
cal and cosmological arguments.
An icon is a useful concept for what I am
suggesting about the teleological and cosmo-
logical arguments. In the Orthodox Christian
tradition, icons are images (paintings, murals,
frescos) that induce the observer to perceive
a deeper, supernatural reality^' beyond the
image. I suggest that the teleological and cos-
mological arguments are also iconic, in that
meditation upon them reveals the hidden or-
der of God's immanent presence. I think that
this iconic reading is more useful than the tra-
ditional way^ of thinking of them as proofs
to convince unbelievers of the existence of
God.
In regard to the teleological argument, Sir
Edmund Whittaker in his 1946 Donnellan
Lectures noted that modern cosmology dis-
closes an intramundane God in the "order, sys-
tem, adjustment, fitness in the nature of things
and in their relations to other things." ^"^
The fact that the laws of mathematics
are valid over the entire cosmos,
showing that everything is interrelated
and consistent, leads to the inference
that there is only a single mind involved
in the whole creation.""'
Zycinski makes mention of this same fact,
but adds another element to his conclusion.
[P]hysics itself... never asks why the
laws of nature exist when nature itself
could have been an uncoordinated
disorder in which no regularities could
have been determined. Physics
presupposes the uniformity of nature,
and this presupposition constitutes a
conditio sine qua non for the existence
of physics in its present fonn.'*^
So, Zycinski and Whittaker see that the
essential presupposition of modern science is
that the order observed in the world extends
throughout the chaos. This assumption of
uniform order (which itself can never be ex-
plained by science) is undoubtedly a feature
built into the human mind. It is a feature that
corresponds, one hopes, to a deeper, true or-
der that actually exists in the cosmos. And
this cosmic order may itself correspond to a
deeper, divine immanence in creation. The
jumps from psychology to metaphysics, and
from metaphysics to theology in these last two
statements are not too large, and seem entirely
warranted to me. Meditation on these fea-
tures of existence—psychological order cor-
responding to cosmic order corresponding to
divine immanent order—unveils the imma-
nent God whose glory the orderly heavens
declare.
In regard to the cosmological argument,
Zycinski writes:
[l|n this approach a Clarkcan God of
edges is replaced by an immanent God
sustaining his creation in all moments
of lime. He remains also transcendent
to the created world in the sense that, as
the Creator he remains the fount of
being for all creation.^**
There is an important intellectual tradition
within Christianity that defines the status of
creation in terms of dependence of the cre-
ated object on its Creator. It was Thomas
Aquinas who wrote the following:
Creation is none other than the relation
of the creature to the creator as to the
principle of its very being."*''
This relation remains independent of time;
in the Christian intellectual tradition it is de-
scribed as either creatio confinna or creatio
passiva.
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So, in an iconic reading of the cosmologi-
cal argument, this meditation comes to rest
upon a God who is constantly upholding the
universe with the divine breath. In brief, the
teleological argument is transfonned from a
proof of a deistic watchmaker into an
epistemic pointer, a suggestive sign or sym-
bol that exposes, unveils, and reveals the or-
dering activity of an immanent God. The cos-
mological argument, instead of being a proof
for a cosmic jump-stiirter, becomes an icon
pointing the way to the presence of the im-
manent God, who constantly upholds, sus-
tains, and makes real a creation that would
have no reality apart from God.
A major theme in this paper is the thor-
ough enmeshment of Hawking's NBP with
the teleological and ontological arguments
for the existence of God. I have shown that
Hawking's presentation of the NBP is em-
bedded in evasions of the logic of those ar-
guments. I have also shown that the NBP
was motivated by dubious assumptions about
the laws of nature and their incompatibility
with the existence of God. And yet. how-
ever precarious are the philosophical foun-
dations of the NBP, and however
wrongheaded its implications for theism, the
NBP is an amazing achievement. In the fi-
nal estimate, the NBP must be praised as a
work of creative scientific genius. Also, the
NBP can be a source of creative thinking
about God's relationship to the universe and
a prod for theists to reinterpret adequately
the teleological and cosmological arguments,
with greater attention to God's immanence.
I find that the relationship between the NBP
and the existence of God is at least amicable,
if not entirely cordial.
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Endnotes:
1. Hawking, p. x.
2. A singularity is the idea that at the begin-
ning of time, the universe was once a point of
infinite density and infinite space-time cur-
vature. A singularity is predicted mathemati-
cally by Einstein's theory of General Relativ-
ity. However, the idea was unacceptable to
most scientists until Hawking and Roger
Penrose showed that Black Holes (whose ex-
istence can be empirically demonstrated) con-
tain these singularities.
3. Interestingly, quantum mechanics and
general relativity have generally been tiiken
198 The Journal of Faith and Science Exchange, 2000
to be contradictory (the former being indeter-
ministic, the hitter being deterministic).
Hawking predicts that they will be reconciled
(perhaps by superstring theory.
4. Ibid., p. 174.
5. Zycinski, "Metaphysics and Epistemol-
ogy."
6. I refer to the brute fact of order in the
cosmos as "cosmic order." This term does
not imply any element of theistic involvement.
A more theistically laden term for the same
phenomenon is "fine-tuning."
7. These four physical constants (and many
other similar examples of precisely balanced
physical constants) deserve the appellation,
"cosmic order." This is because, if they were
just the tiniest bit higher or lower, the uni-
verse would be either instantly annihilated or
intensely uninteresting.
8. Hawking, p. 122.
9. Ibid., p. 125.
10. Hawking takes the SAP to mean that
there are many different universes or regions
of the universe each with a different initial
configuration and set of laws.
11. The universe may be ordered, not be-
cause it is fine-tuned, but merely because we
happen to be in one of the few universes that
allowed for intelligent life. Our amazement
at fine-tuning would grow dull if we learned
that we live in one universe among many —
the one that contains intelligent-life-generat-
ing laws.
12. Hawking rejects the SAP on two
grounds: the principle of economy cuts out
the idea of multiple universes, and the whole
tide of the history of science tlies in the face
of gross anthropocentrism.
13. The intlationary model describes an ex-
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